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Mentalization research focuses on different aspects of this topic, highlighting individual
differences in mentalizing and proposing programs of intervention for children and
adults to increase this ability. The “Thought in Mind Project” (TiM Project) provides
training targeted to adults—teachers or parents—to increase their mentalization and,
consequently, to obtain mentalization improvement in children. The present research
aimed to explore for the first time ever the potential of training for teachers based on
the TiM Project, regarding the enhancement of mentalizing of an adult who would have
interacted as a teacher with children. For this reason, two teachers – similar for meta-
cognitive and meta-emotional skills - and their classes (N = 46) were randomly assigned
to the training or control condition. In the first case, the teacher participated in training on
the implementation of promotion of mentalizing in everyday school teaching strategies;
in the second case the teacher participated in a control activity, similar to training for
scheduling and methods, but without promoting the implementation of mentalization
(in both conditions two meetings lasting about 3 h at the beginning of the school year
and two supervisions during the school year were conducted). The children were tested
by tasks assessing several aspects of mentalization (second and third-order false belief
understanding, Strange Stories, Reading the mind in the Eyes, Mentalizing Task) both
before and after the teacher participate in the TiM or control training (i.e., at the beginning
and at the end of the school year). The results showed that, although some measured
components of mentalization progressed over time, only the TiM Project training group
significantly improved in third order false belief understanding and changed - in a greater
way compared to the control group – in two of the three components of the Mentalizing
Task. These evidences are promising about the idea that the creation of a mentalizing
community promotes the mentalization abilities of its members.
Keywords: mentalizing, theory of mind, training, teacher-pupil relationship, TiM Project, resilience
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INTRODUCTION
Mentalizing and theory of mind are two constructs often used
interchangeably, although they cannot be considered perfectly
overlapping (Sharp and Venta, 2012). Analyzing the studies
in this area, it emerges that mentalizing is the construct
more often used in the “clinical framework,” whereas theory
of mind is the construct more often used in the “cognitive
and socio-constructivist one.” This study is in line with those
theoretical positions that highlight the similarities rather than
the differences between these two concepts. We also explicitly
refer to the literature that stresses the relational co-construction
of children’s theory of mind thanks to their relationships with
significant caregivers (Dunn et al., 1991; Dunn, 1994). The
importance of this interpersonal dimension is largely responsible
for the individual differences in the developmental paths of
mentalization. Mentalization, or mentalizing (Allen, 2006), is a
mental activity consisting in the ability to understand and to
interpret human behavior on the basis of intentional mental states
as beliefs, desires, intentions, goals, and emotions (Bateman and
Fonagy, 2006; Fonagy, 2006; Choi-Kain and Gunderson, 2008;
Fonagy and Allison, 2012). Mentalizing is an imaginative activity
including a wide range of cognitive operations about one’s own
and others’ mind, such as interpreting, inferring, remembering
and so on (Allen, 2003). Choi-Kain and Gunderson (2008)
identified three dimensions of the construct of mentalization: (1)
the functioning (implicit and explicit), (2) the objects (self and
others), and (3) the aspects (cognitive and affective). The first
dimension refers to the fact that mentalization can be an implicit,
automatic, and pre-reflective process when the subject acts on the
basis of an intuition about mental contents (for example, during
a conversation), but also an explicit, symbolic, and conscious
activity when the individual intentionally reflects about the
mind (for example, in psychotherapy; Allen et al., 2008). The
second dimension indicates that mentalizing happens during
interactions (Allen, 2006) where people reflect about the minds
of all the participants of the social exchange. The third dimension
highlights the fact that reasoning about intentional mental
states is usually cognitively focused and affectively laden; the
cognitive and affective aspects are closely connected. Moreover,
the mentalizing process integrates the ability to reason about
the epistemic mental contents and about emotions. Finally, the
developmental model suggested by Allen et al. (2008) argues
that the mentalization process is rooted in the attachment
relationship established with the first caregiver in infancy and
early childhood.
The concept of mentalization that Fonagy (1991) proposed
derives both from the psychoanalytic term “reflective
functioning,” and from the psychological construct of “theory
of mind” (Choi-Kain and Gunderson, 2008). Based on psycho-
analytic work with borderline patients, a Mentalization Based
Treatment (MBT) was created (Allen and Fonagy, 2006; Bateman
and Fonagy, 2006, 2013): it is a clinical treatment designed to
improve mentalization processes, which is impaired in these
individuals. Recently, MBT has been adapted and applied to other
clinical or atypical situations, including substances abuse, eating
disorders, antisocial personality disorder, parental relationships
at risk (Bateman and Fonagy, 2011), families with adopted
children (Muller et al., 2012), and self-harm in adolescence
(Rossouw and Fonagy, 2012). On the basis of the positive effects
obtained from MBT in increasing mentalizing abilities in the
above-mentioned situations, in recent years several researchers
have been developing programs of intervention for non-clinical
settings, such as schools. For example, Twemlow and colleagues
(2005a,b) applied the mentalization principles in the Peaceful
Schools Program, with the aim to create mentalizing school
communities to reduce violence and bullying. The authors
illustrated the two key components of their approach: (1) violent
individuals and communities are impaired in mentalization,
and (2) power dynamics involving these individuals and their
communities tend to further reduce mentalization abilities. “The
difference between a violent and a non-violent community must be
the degree to which the implicit social conventions are structured
to encourage all participants to be aware of the mental states of
others” (Twemlow and Sacco, 2012, pp. 195–196). The main
components of the Peaceful Schools Program are the following:
(1) positive climate campaigns, stimulating and supporting the
awareness of mental states and their role in violent contexts; (2)
classroom management; i.e., training teachers to not use coercive
discipline, but rather to refer to their mentalization abilities
and to those of children; (3) peer and adult mentorship; i.e.,
training other adults to become mentors, able to intervene in a
mentalistic way during violent episodes outside the classroom;
(4) the “gentle warrior physical education program”; i.e.,
teaching children physical self-control in violent situations (a
low activation of the body allows high activation of the mind);
and (5) reflection time; i.e., the introduction in the classrooms
of a 10 min period at the end of each day devoted to talking,
from a mentalistic point of view, about the trend of the day and
any situations of violence that occurred. The evaluation of the
Peaceful Schools Program, longitudinally applied to children
aged 8–11 years are encouraging (Fonagy et al., 2009). In contrast
with traditional school psychiatry consultation and with usual
treatment at school, this program moderated the increase of
aggressiveness typical of this age period, the victimization
phenomena, and the decline in empathy. Additionally, the
program decreased the number of self-reported aggressive acts
and aggressive bystanding.
Another proposal of the educational application of
mentalization is the “Thought in Mind Project” (TiM Project),
also named “Resilience Program,” created by Bak (2012). The TiM
Project shares with the Peaceful Schools Program the assumption
that the creation of a mentalizing community promotes the
mentalization abilities of its members. Furthermore, it claims
that in these type of communities mentalizing children can
develop several strategies to react to the difficulties in their life,
thus increasing their resilience (see Stein, 2006). This approach
is also in line with the recent rethinking of resilience within
a developmental systems framework, that claims – among
other things – “the possibility of changes that spread across
domains and levels through the many interactions of systems”
(Masten, 2016, p. 301). The TiM Project addresses mentalization,
resilience, and self-control concepts using simple language,
metaphors, pictures, and short movies available on a dedicated
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website1. Clinicians or researchers propose and explain these
materials to a target group (usually teachers and/or parents),
who then use the materials as they deem most appropriate for
their condition. A follow-up supervision is sometimes provided.
An exploratory pilot study (Bak et al., 2015) proposed the TiM
Project to the staff members of a social club for adolescents with
disruptive behavior in a low income urban area in Denmark.
Results showed that as a consequence of the TiM Project training,
the yearly frequency of situations where the staff members of the
club had to use physical force to solve high-risk conflicts among
adolescents decreased significantly. The mental health of the staff
increased and the methods introduced by this project continued
to be used by the majority of the staff 3 years later.
The TiM Project training aims to clarify those cognitive
processes strongly impregnated with mental contents through a
metacognitive approach related to both emotional and epistemic
contents. In addition, the training emphasizes the relational
dimension, because it proposes an intervention directed to the
caregivers that is likely to have a positive and long-term effect
on children or adolescents. It may be interesting also to consider
some indicators of the potential changes in children’s mentalizing
ability. In our opinion, the psychological construct that fits this
goal is the theory of mind. The reason is threefold: (1) it is a key
component of mentalizing, (2) it has been explored through a
broad and substantial range of tasks, and (3) its development can
be supported by training specifically designed for this purpose.
Theory of mind is the ability to understand mental states
(intentions, desires, thoughts, and beliefs), and to predict one’s
own and others’ behavior on the basis of these understandings
(Premack and Woodruff, 1978). Theory of mind develops during
childhood and continues to evolve in adolescence (Valle et al.,
2015) and adulthood (Apperly et al., 2009; Sommerville et al.,
2013). According to a socio-constructivist approach, theory of
mind emerges within contexts of social interactions, thanks to
the participation in social exchanges (Astington and Olson, 1995;
Carpendale and Lewis, 2004). In this theoretical perspective, an
interesting construct that focuses on the relational potential in
the mother–child dyad in supporting the development of theory
of mind is mind-mindedness. It is the maternal proclivity to
consider infants as intentional agents with mental states and to
interact with them on the basis of such a belief (Meins et al.,
2002, 2003). In this regard, it was highlighted that maternal
mind-mindedness, operationalized as the ability to individuate
and comment appropriately on their 8-month-olds’ internal
states, was negatively related to children’s externalizing and
internalizing behaviors specifically in low socioeconomic status
families (Meins et al., 2013). Furthermore, mind-mindedness
appears to be an important aspect of personal relationships
rather than a trait-like quality (Meins et al., 2014). In this
sense, it is likely that adults—supported in the development
of activities of mentalization—may find it easier to engage
in mentalization-oriented relationships. This evidence provides
support to the implementation of the TiM Project, whose strong
point is the involvement of the adults who take care of the
children in the educational setting. Moreover, many research
1http://myresilience.org
studies have shown that high levels of theory of mind are
linked to different abilities, such as social competences (Jenkins
and Astington, 2000; Razza, 2009), prosocial behaviors (Caputi
et al., 2012), academic results (Malecki and Elliot, 2002; Lecce
et al., 2011), and attribution of intentions in different daily
situations (for example, attribution of fair or unfair intention
during economical exchanges; Castelli et al., 2010, 2014). In light
of these findings, several interventions have been constructed
and evaluated in order to implement theory of mind in children.
In typical development, different types of training positively
affect theory of mind abilities in the short and medium term
(Slaughter and Gopnik, 1996; Kloo and Perner, 2008; Grazzani
and Ornaghi, 2011; Lecce et al., 2014; Ornaghi et al., 2014;
Grazzani et al., 2016). In the case of learning disorders (Ashcroft
et al., 1999) and intellectual disabilities (Adibsereshki et al.,
2014), theory of mind training improved reflective and social
skills. To construct and directly evaluate such training and its
effects on the psychological development of children, classical
and advanced theory of mind tasks are used. The possibility
to rigorously evaluate the effect of these different types of
training using psychological tasks has supported our idea that
it is possible to realize a similar assessment in the TiM Project,
which has been subjected only to indirect evaluations thus
far (Bak et al., 2015). Any confirmation of the validity of
the TiM project would be particularly interesting. In fact,
this training is aimed at teachers and supports them in the
implementation of strategies for the development of children’s
mentalizing. The effects of this training are therefore indirect,
as the aim is to support the children through an intervention
involving teachers. If effective, the potential is considerable:
maximum efficiency with low costs (since the teachers can
use these strategies with all the children with whom they
come into contact), and a greater likelihood of generalization
and persistence of acquired skills due to the high integration
of support practices to mentalizing within normal teaching
strategies.
Aims and Hypotheses
This research aimed to evaluate for the first time the efficacy of
the TiM Project on a group of 10-year-old pupils. The hypothesis
was that children whose teacher participated in the TiM Project
training would improve theory of mind and mentalization styles
more than a control group of children whose teacher participated
in a training without mentalistic contents.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Forty-six ten-year-old children belonging to two school classes
and the respective two teachers who spend more time with
the class during the school year took part in the study. The
two school classes were randomly assigned to the study groups:
the TiM Project training group (N = 23, M = 10.26 years,
SD = 3.16 months; 10 boys, 13 girls) and the control training
group (N = 23, M = 10.23 years, SD = 5.16 months; 13 boys,
10 girls). All children were Italian and of middle socioeconomic
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 August 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1213
fpsyg-07-01213 August 30, 2016 Time: 16:9 # 4
Valle et al. Promoting Mentalizing in Pupils
status based on the parents’ education and socioeconomic
levels. Children were not clinically referred for any cognitive
or learning difficulties and were neither referred to social
services nor reported by teachers for learning and socio-relational
difficulties. The children were tested for those skills on which
we hypothesized that the TiM Project training with the teachers
would have a positive effect. The two teachers who participated
in the study were both female, 34 and 35 years of age, and had a
master degree and 10 years of working experience at the school.
The teachers, depending on the class, participated in either the
meetings for TiM project training or the meetings for the control
group training.
Tasks and Training
All children were evaluated by the following tasks in both the pre-
and post-training phases (i.e., at the beginning and at the end
of the school year, which was approximately a 6-month interval
between the two phases).
Mentalizing Task
The Mentalizing Task (Sharp et al., 2007; Di Terlizzi, 2010)
evaluates children’s mentalizing attributional styles in everyday
life situations. The styles include the following: overly negative
(ON), a cognitive mentalizing bias characterized by a global,
negative, and stable self-attribution of the causes of social
situations (“They would think nobody likes me”) typical of
children with symptoms of depression and anxiety (Quiggle
et al., 1992; Barrett et al., 1996); overly positive (OP), a cognitive
mentalizing bias characterized by a global, positive, and stable
self-attribution of the causes of social situations (“They would
think I’m cool not to play silly games with the rest of the
kids”) typical of aggressive children (David and Kistner, 2000)
idealizing their own competence in interpersonal relationships;
rational or neutral (R), a non-self-referent, non-stable type of
interpretation of social situations (“They would think I’m just
sitting down to have a think and a rest”) typical of children
with a helpful, functional, and adaptive coping style. This forced-
choice task, which lasts 10 to 15 min per child, included 15 stories
and vignettes about social situations that happen at school to a
certain child. At the end of each story, the researcher asked the
participant the following: “Imagine you are [the character]. If you
were, what do you think the other kids would be thinking about
you?” The participant can choose among three options that reflect
one of three mutually exclusive categories: ON, OP, or R that
represent the three final variables. Each variable score can range
from 0 to 15.
False Belief Tasks
To test children’s cognitive theory of mind competence we used
two second-order false belief tasks (second FBTs; Sullivan et al.,
1994; Astington et al., 2002; Liverta Sempio et al., 2005) and a
third-order false belief task (third FBT; Valle et al., 2015), all based
on the unexpected transfer paradigm. The two second FBTs were
the Look Prediction version (LP) and the Say Prediction version
(SP) (Sullivan et al., 1994; Astington et al., 2002; Liverta Sempio
et al., 2005). In the LP and SP versions there are two control
questions, two false belief questions, and a justification question.
In the third FBT there are two control questions, a second-order
false belief question with its justification, and a third-order false
belief question with its justification. We attributed 1 point for
each correct answer and 0 points for each wrong answer. The total
score range is 0–2 for the second FBT and 0–2 for the third FBT.
Two raters independently coded 33% of the responses at pre- and
post-test and inter rater agreement was established using Cohen’s
Kappa. This agreement was very high for both the second FBTs
(at pre-test, LP: κ= 0.92; SP: κ= 0.89; at post-test, LP: κ= 1; SP:
κ = 0.90) and the third FBT (at pre-test, κ = 0.92; at post-test,
κ= 0.93).
Strange Stories
The Strange Stories (Happé, 1994) evaluate the application of
theory of mind ability in everyday social situations. This task
consists of 24 short stories where the protagonist does or says
something strange, in order for the participant to explain the
character’s strange behavior or provide a statement referring to
the mental contents of the protagonist. As a control task the
Physical Stories were used, in which in order to explain the
character’s behavior or provide a statement, the participant has
no need to refer to the mental contents of the character. In the
present research we selected four Strange Stories (concerning
sarcasm, double bluff, persuasion, and contrary emotions) and
four Physical Stories. Two Strange Stories have one question,
whereas the other two Strange Stories have two comprehension
questions. Furthermore, each story has a justification question.
Each comprehension question is scored 1 if correct and 0 if
wrong. The justification question is scored 2 if correct and has
an explicit answer, 1 if partially correct, and 0 if wrong. The total
score range is 0–18. Each Physical Story has a comprehension
question coded 2 if correct and has an explicit answer, 1 if partially
correct, and 0 if wrong. The total score range is 0–8. Two raters
independently coded 33% of the responses at pre- and post-test
and inter rater agreement was established using Cohen’s Kappa.
This agreement was very high for both the Strange Stories (at pre-
test, κ = 0.89; at post-test, κ = 0.90) and the Physical Stories (at
pre-test, κ= 0.92; at post-test, κ= 0.98).
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test-Child Version
To test the affective component of theory of mind we used the
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test-Child Version (RMET; Baron-
Cohen et al., 2001; Castelli, 2010) that requires the attribution of
mental states to other people by observing the eye region of their
face. The test comprises 28 pictures of the eye region of different
people. The participant has to choose among four options the one
that best represents what the character is thinking or feeling. Only
one option is correct and is scored 1 point, with all other answers
receiving a score of 0 points. The total score range is 0–28.
Teacher Characteristics and Teacher Training
The two teachers took part in the training and control activities,
depending on their group assignment. We constructed and
proposed training based on the TiM Project principles and
methods, and supervised the teacher during the application
of the TiM Project methods with two meetings during the
school year. We also developed a control activity, similar to
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 August 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1213
fpsyg-07-01213 August 30, 2016 Time: 16:9 # 5
Valle et al. Promoting Mentalizing in Pupils
training for scheduling and methods, but without promoting the
implementation of mentalization within the standard educational
strategies. Meta-cognitive and meta-emotional skills of the two
teachers were evaluated prior to the study by administering the
MESI (Moè et al., 2010), a set of questionnaires that assess
working practice, teaching satisfaction, positive and negative
emotions related to work, positive and negative emotions related
to the role of teacher, teaching strategies, self-efficacy and
upgradeability (see Table 1). Both teachers showed values in
line with the psychometric characteristics derived from the
Italian validation of the measure. Specifically, all the scores
were significantly distant from the critical thresholds identified
for each scale and the two teachers’ values for each scale
differ one from another appreciably less than one standard
deviation.
Test Condition: the TiM Project Training
The aims of the TiM Project training were to introduce and to
explain the key concepts and methods of the TiM Project, to
involve the teacher in the direct experience of these methods, and
to reflect together on the way to apply the TiM Project methods
in the classroom with children. The TiM Project training was
organized in two meetings, each lasting 3 h. At the end of the
training, the teacher proposed the TiM Project methods to the
classroom in the way the teacher liked, meeting the researcher for
a supervision session on 2 days during the school year. Moreover,
the teacher could ask for support at any time, contacting the
researcher by e-mail or by the phone.
In the first meeting of the TiM Project training the researcher
explained “The Thinking Brain and The Alarm Center,” which
concern two concepts regarding brain functioning and are the
basis of the TiM Project (Bak, 2012; Bak et al., 2015). Moreover,
the researcher explained the importance of the ability to direct
attention to one’s own thoughts in order to know one’s own
mind. For each concept, activities and games were proposed
to clarify explanations and to suggest possible activities to use
with children. In the case of “The Thinking Brain and The
Alarm Center,” the teacher had to draw a picture representing
her brain on alert, then the teacher had to build a spotlight of
attention with paper and use it to observe the world around.
In both cases, reflection on the activities was promoted by the
researcher.
In the second meeting, the term “resilience” was introduced
and it was linked to the body-mind relationship. The activity
proposed was the construction of a poster with a list of stressful
situations of everyday life at school and the identification of the
strategies that the teacher could use, with a focus on cognitive and
emotional regulation strategies (involving the management of
the alarm system). Moreover, the researcher introduced the TiM
stories, such as the story of the “House of Thoughts” (Bak, 2012;
Bak et al., 2015): a metaphor of the brain as a house of thoughts
with the possibility to visit different rooms containing positive
and negative thoughts (an example of the story is provided in the
Appendix). To better understand the contents of this story, the
teacher participated in a role play acting the role of a thought that
inhabits one’s own brain.
At the end of this training the researcher guided a reflection on
how to use the TiM Project methods with the children, and then
the researcher delivered to the teacher the TiM Project Manual
consisting of the Italian translation of the contents of the TiM
Project website. During the following months, the researcher
met the teacher twice to know how the teacher proceeded in
applying the techniques, and to guide her in the preparation of
new activities for the classroom. The teacher could also benefit
from online or telephone support (advice, clarification, and
suggestions) provided by the researcher over the entire length of
the project.
Control Condition: the Non-mentalizing Training
The aims of the control condition training were to promote
reflection about the teaching strategies that the teacher can
apply in the classroom. More specifically, the focus was on the
advantages and disadvantages of the traditional lecture method,
and the strategies to support collaborative and cooperative
learning. The control condition training was organized in two
meetings.
In the first meeting the researcher explained the advantages
and disadvantages of the traditional lecture method, and the
teacher discussed professional experiences with this method and
on the role as tutor of collective reasoning.
In the second meeting, the properties and the differences
of cooperative learning (Johnson and Johnson, 2012) and
collaborative learning (Nagata and Ronkowski, 1998) were
discussed. The researcher explained the strategies and methods
to encourage the active participation of students, and to promote
the responsibility of each pupil in the working group. As in the
TiM Project training, the teacher could also benefit from online
or telephone support (advice, clarification, and suggestions)
provided by the researcher over the entire length of the project.
TABLE 1 | Value of the MESI scales for the two teachers.
Measures WP TSA ERW+ ERRT+ ERW− ERRT− TS SE UP
TEACHER 1 (Training
group)
4.08 5.80 4.20 3.92 1.53 2.06 3.6 8.00 8.5
TEACHER 2 (Control
group)
4.12 6.00 4.23 4.15 1.65 1.76 4.13 8.29 8.88
CRITICAL
THRESHOLDS (SD)
<3.68 (0.40) <3.89 (1.10) <2.87 (0.63) <2.50 (0.71) >2.38 (0.52) >2.60 (0.59) <2.99 (0.59) <5.97 (1.06) <5.92 (1.20)
WP, working practice; TSA, teaching satisfaction; ERW+, positive emotions related to work; ERRT+, positive emotions related to the role of teacher; ERW−, negative
emotions related to work; ERRT−, negative emotions related to the role of teacher; TS, teaching strategies; SE, self-efficacy; UP, upgradeability.
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Procedures
The research was organized in three steps.
Step 1: Children were tested for their mentalization and theory
of mind abilities (pre-test, 5 weeks after the beginning of the
school year), and teachers participated in the TiM Project training
or the control group training.
Step 2: Each teacher applied the training that she participated
in, and teachers received supervision both in the presence of the
researcher (two meetings during the school year, respectively, 2
and 4 months from the pre-test) and remotely (on-line).
Step 3: Children were re-tested for their mentalization and
theory of mind abilities (post-test, 5 weeks at the end of the school
year).
Each child was interviewed individually in two sessions of
about 20–25 min each in a quiet room at the school. The
procedure was identical for each participant. All tasks were
administered in a fixed order. No feedback was given to children’s
answers in the pre-test and in the post-test sessions. Teachers
were trained in a room of the school. Informed parental
consent was obtained for the children, and informed consent
was obtained from each teacher. The three steps of the research
were conducted by independent researchers. The research was
conducted according to APA ethical standards and was approved
by the local ethics committee.
RESULTS
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the explored variables
at pre-test and post-test for the two groups; namely, the total
scores of each task as they have been used in subsequent analyses
unless otherwise specified.
We conducted some preliminary analyses to verify the
homogeneity of the groups for the considered variables at the
pre-test session. The t-test for independent samples did not
show any statistically significant differences between the children
assigned to the TiM Project training group and the children
assigned to the control training group (all ps > 0.05).
Next, we performed a GLM for repeated measures for each
variable explored (Mentalizing task, second and third order false
belief tasks, Strange Stories, RMET) with time (pre-test and
post-test) as the within-subjects factor and training groups (TiM
Project and control) as the between-subjects factor. In order to
test the training effect. The results showed a significant main
effect of time for LP and SP tasks, Strange Stories, and the OP
and R Mentalizing styles. Performance increased over the time
for second order false belief LP: [F(1,44) = 9.85, p = 0.003,
η2p = 0.186, θ= 0.866]; SP: [F(1,44) = 9.40, p= 0.004, η2p = 0.227,
θ = 0.845] and Strange Stories understanding [F(1,44) = 27.46,
p = 0.001, η2p = 0.384, θ = 0.999]. Furthermore, the OP style
decreased [F(1,44) = 30.1, p = 0.000, η2p = 0.406, θ = 1],
whereas the R styles increased [F(1,44) = 37.30, p = 0.000,
η2p = 0.459, θ = 1]. The results also showed a significant
interaction between time and training groups for the third
FBT [F(1,44) = 24.18, p = 0.001, η2p = 0.392, θ = 0.999] and
the Mentalizing task [F(2,43) = 4.48, p = 0.017, η2p = 0.173,
θ= 0.737].
More specifically, pairwise comparisons revealed that, for the
third FBT, the children in the TiM Project training group showed
a significantly higher post-test performance compared to the
post-test performance of children in the control training group
[F(1,44) = 26.62, p= 0.001, η2p = 0.377, θ= 0.999] (see Figure 1).
With regard to the Mentalizing task, in the post-test the
children in the TiM Project training group showed a significantly
higher performance on the R style of the task [F(1,44) = 12.44,
p = 0.001, η2p = 0.220, θ = 0.932] and a significantly lower
performance on the OP style of the task [F(1,44) = 24.24,
p = 0.001, η2p = 0.355, θ = 0.998] than children in the control
training group (see Figures 2 and 3).
DISCUSSION
The present research preliminarily explored the efficacy of the
TiM Project training on mentalization performance in 10-year-
old pupils. To this aim, we tested children’s cognitive, affective,
and social components of theory of mind as well as mentalizing
styles. The training succeeded in promoting specific elements of
mentalistic ability. We will discuss these results starting from
disentangling this specificity from the mere time effect that
occurred with regard to some variables.
Performance on the second-order false belief tasks and Strange
Stories showed an increase over time. The understanding of the
second level of recursivity begins to be successfully overcome
around 7 years of age, although in his review Miller (2009)
pointed out that the available studies indicate that this type of
task continues to improve until pre-adolescence. This period
appears to be a sensible one also for the development of the
comprehension of ambiguous social situations—here measured
through the Strange Stories—where mentalization is implied. On
the contrary, this was not the case for the capacity to “read”
the mind through the eyes, because performance on average was
already well developed and the RMET did not improve with
time. The rational attributional style and the overly positive style
also changed with time: the former increasing and the latter
decreasing in respective scores. However, while the improvement
in second order false belief understanding and ambiguous social
situations understanding seems not to depend on the TiM project
training, third order false belief understanding and the changes
in mentalizing styles appear to be significantly supported by the
training itself.
As for the comprehension of the third level of recursivity,
the presence of the training effect could be interpreted
in terms of efficacy of the teacher’s intervention in the
pupils’ zone of proximal development (ZoPed), although no
classroom observations were taken. In fact, this action pulls the
comprehension from very low levels to intermediate ones. The
same does not happen in the case of the second order false belief
tasks (LP and SP). Considering together the results about the
false belief understanding, the ZoPed acts on the comprehension
of the third level of recursivity similar to what time does with
the second level of recursivity. The absence of the effect of
time and training on the RMET is not surprising; in fact, the
average performance is already medium-high in the pre-test
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TABLE 2 | Descriptive statistics of the explored variables for children.
TiM project condition Control condition
Pre Post Pre Post
Measures n M SD n M SD p n M SD n M SD p
SS 23 8.70 2.49 23 9.91 2.31 0.002 23 7.87 1.77 23 9.65 2.67 0.001
PS 23 5.04 1.77 23 5.57 1.38 0.208 23 5.00 1.54 23 5.65 1.37 0.126
RMET-C 23 19.09 3.83 23 19.65 3.08 0.483 23 18.13 3.07 23 17.52 2.57 0.359
Third FBT 23 0.56 0.79 23 1.65 0.57 0.016 23 0.56 0.79 23 0.61 0.78 0.285
Second FBT SP 18 0.67 0.91 22 1.23 0.97 0.004 18 0.94 0.99 21 1.47 0.87 0.003
Second FBT LP 22 1.45 0.74 22 1.95 0.21 0.002 23 1.35 0.93 23 1.74 0.69 0.106
MT ON 23 4.00 1.86 23 3.39 1.73 0.225 23 3.61 1.92 23 3.04 1.55 0.178
MT R 23 6.70 2.10 23 9.91 2.02 0.000 23 7.09 1.86 23 7.83 1.99 0.077
MT OP 23 4.26 1.68 23 1.70 1.40 0.000 23 4.30 1.49 23 4.00 1.76 0.455
n, number of participants; M, mean score; SD, standard deviation; SS, Strange Stories; PS, physical stories; RMET-C, Reading the mind in the eyes test-child version;
third FBT, third-order false belief task; second FBT SP, second-order false belief task say prediction version; second FBT LP, second-order false belief task look prediction
version; MT ON, mentalizing task overly negative style; MT R, mentalizing task rational style; MT OP, mentalizing task overly positive style. P-values refer to the t-test for
paired samples between pre- and post-conditions within each group.
FIGURE 1 | Third-order FBT performance for TiM Project group and control group at pre-test and post-test.
session. Furthermore, it is in line with the performance of slightly
older subjects (see for example Sharp, 2008, in which a sample
of children with an average age equal to 11 obtained a mean
performance of 17.96 on the RMET). So, we can hypothesize that
the time frame considered was not sufficiently long enough in
order to have an effect on this ability. Kaland et al. (2008) showed
that the performance of a sample with an average age of 15.6
obtained a mean performance score of 23.16. In addition, the
training did not have more of an effect by being more focused
on metacognitive abilities than affective aspects directly implied
in the RMET.
With regard to the training effect on the OP and R mentalizing
styles, the literature shows that the critical age for a change in
attributional style is 7–11 year-olds. Indeed, from 4 to 7 years
of age children generally attribute an overly positive judgment
to peers about their behavior, whereas from 8 years on the
attributional style becomes more rational and more congruent
with objective indicators (Damon and Hart, 1991; Berndt and
Burgy, 1996; Harter, 1999). Furthermore, Sharp et al. (2007)
also corroborated the presence of a critical period for variations
in the attributional style of children ages 7 to 11 years old,
suggesting that these changes are closely related to the ability to
take the perspective of others in complex social situations. The
participants in the present study are in the top margin of this
critical range. Therefore, it is plausible that they have already
undergone the developmental changes. This fact would explain
the absence of the effect of time. On the contrary, the training
may promote a change in the ZoPed, anticipating a change that
it is likely to appear later. This explanation is also consistent with
the work of Meins et al. (2002, 2006) showing that the maternal
proclivity to consider the child as an individual with mental states
and not just as the bearer of needs supports the acquisition of
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FIGURE 2 | MT-Rational style for TiM Project group and control group at pre-test and post-test.
FIGURE 3 | MT-Overly positive style for TiM Project group and control group at pre-test and post-test.
the child’s mentalistic skills according to longitudinal dynamics.
This attitude, otherwise known as mind-mindedness, offers the
child the opportunity to engage actively with his or her own
and others’ mental states, and to understand the mentalistic
attitudes that people have toward the world. This relational
competence is exercised in the ZoPed and, through the process of
internalization, affects the child’s ability to interact mentally with
partners (Laranjo et al., 2014; Meins et al., 2014).
The fact that the teacher had attended the TiM Project
training and had used the training in the classroom increased
the children’s capacity to apply a rational attributional style
to other’s mind, and decreased the tendency to use an overly
positive attributional style. This result supports the efficacy of
the TiM Project training application in the classroom, and
suggests that teachers involved in it can help their pupils
to increase an attributional style that can act as a potential
protective factor against psychopathology (Baumeister et al.,
1996). In fact, although it has been observed that children
have the tendency to misperceive the thoughts, feelings, and
intentions of others (O’Connor and Hirsch, 1999), it seems that
emotional disorders are associated with specific attributional
styles in childhood (Ingram et al., 1998). Sharp et al. (2007)
affirmed that an overly positive attributional style (i.e., estimating
the judgment of peers on themselves in an overly positive way)
combined with a lack of a rational attributional style (i.e., an
objective evaluation of other people’s thoughts) is associated
with symptoms of externalizing disorder (as individuated by
teachers). Additionally, Hughes et al. (1997, 2001), David and
Kistner (2000), and Brendgen et al. (2004) linked together the
aggression in primary school children, the over-estimation of
peer acceptance, and the tendency to idealize the perception of
one’s own qualities.
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Although Mentalizing tasks and the Strange Stories have the
common aim of investigating theory of mind understanding
in complex social situations, the performance on the Strange
Stories was not affected by the training. This discrepancy can
be explained by considering two aspects related to the tasks.
The first one concerns the characteristics of the tasks in terms
of instructions and test questions. In fact, theory of mind
understanding is evaluated in the mentalizing task by asking
the child to put him/herself in another person’s shoes, whereas
the Strange Stories asks the child to explain another person’s
behavior. The Mentalizing task requires a first person simulation
of another’s mind, which is isomorphic to the way the content
of the TiM project training is implemented by the teachers in
the classroom. The second aspect that can explain the above-
mentioned discrepancy regards the structure of the test questions.
In the Mentalizing task, children are faced with a forced choice
among three possible answers (corresponding to the three
mentalizing styles), while in the Strange Stories children are
faced with open questioning. Due to its intrinsic metacognitive
features, the TiM project training appears to be more suited
for promoting a form of mentalization more coherent with
the forced choices format than with the open questioning
format. Finally, the social situations proposed in the Strange
Stories imply the understanding of numerous components of
theory of mind that the TiM Project training does not involve
[for example, the case of irony and sarcasm (Massaro et al.,
2014)].
This study, despite offering some interesting evidence
supporting the implementation of mentalizing strategies,
presents some methodological issues that need to be carefully
evaluated for the interpretation of the results. First, the sample
size is limited: only two classes were compared. Accordingly,
only two teachers, for the training and the control groups,
were involved. Secondly, classroom observations should be
implemented in order to evaluate the teacher’s strategies
applied to support mentalization and to identify situations in
which the TiM Project can be used with the greatest impact.
Finally, although teachers did not differ in metacognitive
and metaemotional skills, their mentalizing abilities were not
directly evaluated in the pre-training phase. The possibility
that the significant variation observed in children’s mentalizing
abilities depended on past differences between the teachers
cannot be excluded. However, it is important to note that
teachers were involved in training and the children tested for
mentalizing abilities during the 5th year of primary school
(i.e., after 4 years of interaction with their teachers), and
that in the pre-training phase there were no differences in
children’s mentalizing abilities between the two groups of
children.
Future research should replicate these results with better
management of these issues. Furthermore, given that recently
Bak et al. (2015) evaluated the welfare of the operators involved
in the training, the inclusion of teacher evaluations may prove
to be a significant element. Finally, the inclusion of a wider
sample of teachers that allows the exploration of possible
covariates of the implementation of mentalizing strategies is
highly desirable.
CONCLUSION
This study provides some preliminary evidence to support
the validity of the TiM Project. It is likely that a teacher
who has an increased understanding of mental functioning,
and who can talk about it in the classroom, is able to
help children to increase their mentalistic skills. In particular,
children improve their mentalizing attributional style (from
overly positive to rational), which consequently can reduce the
risk of psychopathology, increase the level of recursive thinking
in cognitive theory of mind, and increase learning to reason
at a third level of recursivity. Although these findings require
further investigation, they remain promising about the idea
that the creation of a mentalizing community promotes the
mentalization abilities of its members, evaluating for the first
time this efficacy on children’s competencies. These communities
can be consistently regarded as the extension of ZoPed within
which, as just mentioned, the mother uses the mind-mindedness
(Laranjo et al., 2014; Meins et al., 2014) to support child’s
mentalization. Similarly, the teachers, specifically trained, will
accompany children in the acquisition of more and more
effective and socially adaptive mentalist abilities (Meins et al.,
2013).
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APPENDIX
Example of TiM Project Story
The Story of The House of Thoughts2
In some way, we may say that our thoughts live inside our heads.
Imagine that your thoughts live in a house with many rooms
where you can wander around and discover them. When you
discover thoughts you are using the world’s finest tool – your
attention, which is a kind of spotlight. When you throw light
on a thought, you spot it and discover it. Thereafter you can
shift your attention and discover another thought. The House of
Thoughts has plenty of rooms – a number of exciting thoughts
may live in one room, perhaps some sad or angry thoughts live in
another room and various happy thoughts live in a third room.
2 From the web site “Resilience” http://robusthed.dk/en/stories-even-stories-from-
real-life/stories/the-story-of-the-house-of-thoughts.
From The House of Thoughts, your thoughts can call you if they
want to be discovered. This may be really exciting and good, but
could be irritating too – especially if the thoughts are annoying
and they keep knocking all the time, trying to take charge over
your attention. In the case, where you have sad or angry thoughts
that take charge and force you into their room all the time, you
might end up believing there are no exciting or happy thoughts
to be found anywhere and that is not much fun.... Yet this is
not the case at all. All the happy and exciting thoughts are just
waiting in other rooms in the House of Thoughts, waiting for
you to discover them with your attention. Maybe there even are
tools to be found in one room that could be used to fix some
other thoughts in another room in the house. There may also be
thoughts in a room who need to be left in peace, so they won’t
disturb you to much. If you often go to explore The House of
Thoughts with your attention, then it becomes easier to be in
charge with your thoughts.
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